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Revealing Social Functions
through Pragmatic Genealogies
MATTHIEU QUELOZ
T here is an under-appreciated tradition of genealogical explanationthat is centrally concernedwith social functions. I shall refer to it as
the tradition of pragmatic genealogy. It runs from David Hume (T, 3.2.2)
and the early Friedrich Nietzsche (TL) through E. J. Craig (1990, 1993) to
Bernard Williams (2002) and Miranda Fricker (2007).1 These pragmatic
genealogists start out with a description of an avowedly fictional “state
of nature” and end up ascribing social functions to particular building
blocks of our practices – such as the fact that we use a certain concept,
or live by a certain virtue – which we did not necessarily expect to have
such a function at all. That the seemingly archaic device of a fictional
state-of-nature story should be a helpful way to get at the functions of
our actual practices must seem a mystifying proposal, however; I shall
therefore endeavor to demystify it in what follows.
Myaim in this chapter is twofold. First,bydelineating the framework
of pragmatic genealogy and contrasting it with superficially similar
methods, I argue that pragmatic genealogies are best interpreted as
dynamic models whose point is to reveal the function – and non-
coincidentally often the social function – of certain practices. Second,
by buttressing this framework with something it notably lacks, namely
1 More recent additions to the tradition include Martin Kusch and Robin McKenna
(2018b) and Philip Pettit (2018).
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an account of the type of functionality it operates with, I argue that
both the type of functional commitment and the depth of factual
obligation incurred by a pragmatic genealogy depend on what we
use the method for: the dynamic models of pragmatic genealogy can
be used merely as heuristic devices helping us to spot functional
patterns, or more ambitiously as arguments grounding our ascriptions
of functionality to actual practices, or evenmore ambitiously as bases for
functional explanations of the resilience or the persistence of practices.
Bybringing thesedistinctions intoview,wegain the ability todistinguish
strengths and weaknesses of the method’s application from strengths
and weaknesses of the method itself.
1. The Nature and Point of Pragmatic Genealogies
What are the characteristics of pragmatic genealogies? It quickly be-
comes apparent that they have little in common with the genealogies
approximating regular historiography that one finds predominantly
outside philosophy.2 Unlike regularly historiographical genealogies,
pragmatic genealogies do not in the first instance aim to describe
the complex historical roots of a practice and its contingent transfor-
mations over the course of history. At the purely formal level which
remains largely neutral between different substantive interpretations,
the following are typical (though not necessary) features of a pragmatic
genealogy:
2 Pragmatic genealogies also differ from counterfactual state-of-nature scenarios in
a Hobbesian vein, because it in the latter, the state of nature is usually interpreted
as playing a primarily justificatory role in an argument to the effect that a situation
in which there was some form of public authority would be superior even to the
best anarchical state of nature one could reasonably hope for. See Hampton (1987);
Kavka (1986); Nozick (1974, 5). Nozick’s own use of state-of-nature stories is more
complicated, as he does harbor explanatory ambitions. But see Williams (2002, ch. 2)
for a discussion of why these raise problems of their own.
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(i) It begins not in a particular time and place, but in a state of nature,
which differs from the Hobbesian version in that it already con-
tains a small community of social and language-using creatures.
(ii) It describes how these creatures have certain practical needswhich,
in the kind of environment they live in, generate further practical
needs.
(iii) In addition, it occasionally also factors in yet further needs that it
describes as arising out of particular socio-historical configurations
of society.
(iv) It shows how this array of needs issues in the need to solve a
particular practical problem.
(v) It presents a particular bundle of dispositions, concepts, institu-
tions, or conventions as a solution to this practical problem, thus
indicating that given their needs, it would be rational for these
creatures to move into a state in which this particular bundle was
operative.
(vi) It occasionally also describes how the creatures would be able
to get into that state quite naturally, without much foresight or
understanding.
But how are these somewhat quaint-sounding state-of-nature stories
best understood? And what are they supposed to tell us? One way of
making sense of them is to read them as conjectural depictions of early
hominid life in our so-called “environment of evolutionary adaption”
(EEA). The state of nature would then be a stand-in for a historical
situation about which we have very little data. For just this reason, we
would then lack the means to decide whether things actually developed
as the genealogical story presents them, but wemight at least conjecture
how things might possibly have developed. The state-of-nature would
then be a narrative device bywhich to give “howpossibly” explanations.
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An example of a genealogical approach that explicitly embraces this
interpretation is Philip Kitcher’s The Ethical Project (2011).
Where the pragmatic genealogists I listed at the beginning are
concerned, however, things must be more complicated. This is because
they explicitly deny that their state of nature is in the business of
depicting, however conjecturally, the real history of our conceptual
practices. Hume writes that the state of nature is “a mere philosophical
fiction, which never had, and never cou’d have any reality” (T, 3.2.2.14).
Williams insists that “the state of nature is not the Pleistocene” (2002,
27), and Craig likewise emphasizes that the “question ‘when?’ just
doesn’t apply to it” (2007, 193). Philip Pettit (2018) drives the point
home by calling his state of nature “Erewhon,” a Butlerian anagram of
“nowhere.”
How, then, are mere philosophical fictions depicting nowhere in
particular supposed to tell us anything about reality? The answer comes
into viewonce one sees genealogical fictions as akin to idealizingmodels
in the sciences. Drawing on the interpretation of Craig’s genealogy
developedbyMartinKusch andRobinMcKenna (Kusch 2009,2011, 2013;
Kusch and McKenna 2018a, b), I suggest that pragmatic genealogies are
best interpreted as dynamic models – as idealizations with a time-axis.
These dynamic models start out with a strongly idealized situation,
highlight certain practical needs,and showhow these needswoulddrive
a community to develop a prototypical form of a certain conceptual
practice. The model is then de-idealized towards our actual situation
by successively factoring in further needs: needs entailed by the initial
needs the model started out with, but also, as in Williams’s case, needs
factored into the model based on what we know about the actual
history, sociology, and psychology of human beings. But what are these
dynamic models for?
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The point of these genealogical models is to help us understand
what our conceptual practices do for us, i.e. whether and how they tie in
with our practical needs. To this end, pragmatic genealogies typically
work to reveal social functions – to render visible unsuspected ways in
which our conceptual practices meet social needs. Thus Hume offers a
pragmatic genealogyof the virtue of “justice,” i.e. the virtue of respect for
property, which exhibits it as a solution to conflict over external goods;
Nietzsche presents truthfulness as a solution to the problem of deceit
and dissimulation within the community; Craig describes the concept
of knowledge as a tool by which to flag good informants and pool
information; Williams shows how truthfulness facilitates the gaining
and sharing of information; and Fricker highlights the importance of
the virtue of testimonial justice in correcting for prejudice. All of these
pragmatic genealogists seek to uncover an under-appreciated social
function performed by a conceptual practice – a respect in which it
proves beneficial, not (or not just) to the individual who engages in it,
but to the social community as a whole.
The genealogical narrative is useful to this end because it perspic-
uously shows how, from certain practical needs we uncontroversially
have, a need can be derived which we did not necessarily know we
had, namely the practical need for the target practice – the practice
whose social functionality is to be revealed. In contrast to invisible hand
explanations, pragmatic genealogies do not seek to account for the ap-
pearance of design by explaining how something obviously functional
came to be so; rather, they serve to show how something that does not
even look designed in fact turns out to be functional in non-obvious
ways.3 Using a set of needs which one’s addressees identify as having,
3 For a discussion of invisible hand explanations, see Ullmann-Margalit (1978, 1997)
and Tieffenbach (2011, 2013). For a comparison with genealogical explanations, see
Williams (2002, 31–32, 253).
Revealing Social Functions through Pragmatic Genealogies • 6
or which they at least recognize the community to have, we can tell a
genealogical narrative showing how, given this set of needs, the target
practice is in fact called for by the fact that this set of needs entails a
series of further needs issuing in the need for the target practice. This
genealogical derivation of needs from needs will then have the form:
need A, hence need B, hence need C . . . hence need X, where need X
is the need for the target practice. Granted that we actually have need
A, the genealogical story will then give us reason to think that we also
have need X.4
It is along just these lines that Williams (2002), for example, seeks
to reveal the social function of a community’s valuing the truth for its
own sake. To value the truth for its own sake, on Williams’s view, is in
the first instance to value the various states and attitudes expressive of
truthfulness, such as accuracy and sincerity, for their own sake (2002,
6–7).5 To uncover the point of doing so, he begins with a state-of-
nature situation highlighting the need of each individual to gather
information about the immediate environment. This is a need that
human beings have even on a highly generic conception of the person,
which is to say that in ascribing such a need to our agents in the state
of nature, we are not expressing a socio-historically local conception of
the person (we are not, for instance, expressing a distinctively liberal
conception of the person by assuming that each individual has a
strongly demanding need for autonomy). On the basis of this plausibly
generic need-ascription,Williams then points out that the mere fact that
individual inquirers occupy different spots at different times already
entails that any given inquirer would, under certain circumstances,
come to possess what Williams dubs a “purely positional advantage”
4 I say more about when and why one would want to resort to dynamic models to
reveal functionality in Queloz (2017, 2019, Forthcoming-a, b).
5 For a more detailed discussion of Williams’s genealogy, see Queloz (2018b).
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(2002, 42) over other inquirers. And this means that there are strong
pressures on these inquirers not to rely merely on their own senses in
acquiring information,but to engage in the practice of sharing orpooling
information. But this in turn generates the social need to cultivate in all
participating inquirers the dispositions that make good contributors
to the information pool: the dispositions which Williams brings under
the capitalized headings of “Accuracy” and “Sincerity” to mark the fact
that these are, at this point in the story, merely prototypical forms of
what we now understand by “accuracy” and “sincerity.” They are as
yet merely the dispositions involved in getting one’s beliefs right and
openly passing them on to others.
Yet as Williams’s dynamic model makes clear, development cannot
stop there, as the need to cultivate dispositions that make good contrib-
utors to the pool itself leads us to consider further needs. The reason is
that the dispositions in question cannot deliver what is demanded of
them if they do not develop further. The practical value of the individ-
ual inquirer’s exhibition of these dispositions consists largely in their
instrumental value to the community of inquirers: for the individual
inquirer, Sincerity is rarely directly of much use, and Accuracy pays
only to the extent that its benefits for the individual outweigh the costs to
that individual – but there are many pieces of information that would
be of great value to the community even if their acquisition is of no
particular interest, or involves forbiddingly high risks and dangers, to
the individualwho could acquire them. Consequently,mere dispositions
of Accuracy and Sincerity are overly vulnerable to the temptation to
free ride, i.e. to profit from the Accuracy and Sincerity of others while
failing to exhibit them reliably oneself. And since this holds true for
any individual in the community, Accuracy and Sincerity in this form
are not stable solutions to the problem of information pooling.
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A salient way to overcome this problem, Williams argues, is for
Accuracy and Sincerity to come to be regarded as dispositions worth
having and worth exhibiting for their own sake – they need to come to
be regarded (and be commonly known to be regarded) as intrinsically
valuable dispositions or virtues, as Williams puts it (2002, 89–90). And
this in turn generates the need for individuals to be capable of making
sense of these dispositions as intrinsically valuable, which, for Williams,
means that their “value must make sense to them from the inside” –
they must be able to relate Accuracy and Sincerity “to other things that
they value, and to their ethical emotions” (2002, 91–92). If we are to
grasp how these prototypical forms of Accuracy and Sincerity have
been fleshed out “now and around here,” however, and how they have
been “changed, transformed, differently embodied, extended and so
on” (Williams 2007, 132) in response to further needs that are more
clearly historically and socially situated, the dynamic model must then
be de-idealized in that direction. Williams consequently factors in, first,
developments in ancient Greece that led to the extension of Accuracy
to the distant past (2002, ch. 7); second, developments in eighteenth-
century Europe that led to Sincerity’s elaboration into the value of
authenticity (2002, ch. 8); and lastly, the needs of modern-day liberal
democracies to cultivate Accuracy and Sincerity about politics and
political history (2002, chs. 9–10, esp. 231–232, 265–266).
Williams’s genealogy is not coincidentally about the social function
of Accuracy and Sincerity. Such a pragmatic genealogical model serves
to sharpen our eye for functional patterns within our actual conceptual
practices. If it is to have apoint, the functionality it revealsmustbe onewe
are not already fully aware of; and social functions are often particularly
hard to discern. The functionality of practices for the individual are
often easier to discern because looking out for individual benefits is
something we do anyway, whereas the social point of view is one we
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only take up in special circumstances or upon reflection. Moreover,
Williams’s genealogy helps explain why the social function of Accuracy
and Sincerity is hard to discern: it brings out that the fact that we do not
primarily think of Accuracy and Sincerity in functional terms at all –
neither in terms of individual nor of social functionality – is an essential
part of what renders them functional. Their very functionality demands
that their functionality be effaced in favor of intrinsic motivations
– which is why, elsewhere, I have called these particular functional
dynamics the dynamics of self -effacing functionality (Queloz 2018b, §3).
But a pragmatic genealogy derives its interest not just from the fact
that it reveals functionality we are not yet aware of; it also derives it
from its being something of a mystery how and why the target of the
genealogy would have emerged in the first place. Why did individuals
ever come to be Accurate and Sincere where it does not pay for them?
Yes, this has to do with their valuing Accuracy and Sincerity for their
own sake, but to leave it at that is simply to restate the puzzle: Why did
they ever come to value them intrinsically? Is this more than a fetish,
more than a relic from the enchanted world in which God is truth and
truth is divine, as Nietzsche (GM, III, §24) put it? In answer to these
questions, we can usefully construct a model that renders perspicuous
how and why Accuracy and Sincerity would arise naturally, without
mysterious saltations, in response to individual and social needs –
especially if that model can itself explain why these needs would come
to include the need for Accuracy and Sincerity to be valued for their
own sake, even without metaphysical reasons for doing so. Williams’s
model to that extent naturalizes the intrinsic valuing of Accuracy and
Sincerity, and uses this functionally justified intrinsic valuing to explain
how a set of practices serving a social function could have arisen despite
the fact that they were only of limited use to the individuals engaging
in them. The genealogy bridges the gap between individual and social
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functionality on the back of an insight into the social function of intrinsic
values.
If pragmatic genealogies are dynamic models revealing social func-
tions, however, it remains unclear which notion of functionality this
particular brand of functionalism is supposed to operate with. The
pragmatic genealogists themselves provide little guidance in this regard.
Theirwritings leave it underdeterminedwhether their talkof “functions”
should be cashed out in terms of a causal role account of functions à la
Cummins (1975), where functions are ascribed to elements of a system
– such as a heating system – on the basis of what they contribute to the
realization of some systemic capacity we are interested in (such as the
capacity to keep room temperature constant); or in terms of an etiological
account of functions à laWright (1973), Millikan (1989), and Neander
(2017), where functions are ascribed to items based on what these items
were selected to do; or an agentive functions account à la Searle (2010),
where functions are imposed on objects by the purposes of agents, and
even biological functions are thought of as causes that serve a purpose
relative to agents’ values (Searle 2010, 58–60). On the one hand, it can
be seen as a strength of these genealogical approaches that they remain
ecumenical regarding the notion of function they involve. This invites
one to try and plug in whichever notion one prefers or is interested
in. On the other hand, it can also be seen as a weakness, especially
in the light of the barrage of objections to functionalist approaches in
the social sciences.6 These objections express and foster a discomfort
6 I am thinking here of charges such as the following: that functionalism draws on
mysterious forms of teleology by ascribing free-floating purposes without tying
these back to agents or minds whose purposes they are; that it uses future effects to
explain present causes; that its explanations are missing an underlying mechanism;
that ascriptions of functionality are unfalsifiable; that they are vacuous; that they
draw illegitimate analogies to biology; that they fail to tell us why we have the
practices we have rather than equally useful alternatives. For rebuttals of all these
charges using accounts of functions along the lines of those I draw on here, see in
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with functionalist approaches that is bound to prove an obstacle also to
pragmatic genealogies once their functionalist spirit is recognized. In
the remainder of this essay, I will therefore try to dispel such discomfort
by laying bare the functionalist innards of pragmatic genealogies.
2. Functions in and Functions of Pragmatic Genealogy
The key to understanding how pragmatic genealogies work is to distin-
guish what they minimally and primarily do from what they can then
be used to do on that basis. In the first instance, pragmatic genealogies
serve to reveal instrumental relations between certain needs and certain
conceptual practices within a fictional model. They issue in conclusions
of the form: “The function of the prototype of X is to satisfy a need to
Y.” For the pragmatic genealogists discussed above, this formula yields
the following claims:
• The function of the prototype of the virtue of justice is to satisfy a
need to avoid conflicts over external goods (Hume).
• The function of the prototype of the virtue of truthfulness is to
satisfy a need to avoid deception within the community (Niet-
zsche).
• The function of the prototype of the concept of knowledge is to
satisfy a need to flag good informants (Craig).
• The function of the prototype of the virtues of accuracy and sin-
cerity is to satisfy a need to gain and share information effectively
(Williams).
particular Kincaid (1996, 2007), Pettit (1996, 2000), Barnes (1995, 2000), and Rosenberg
(2016a; b, ch. 10). Historically, the work of Ayala (1970),Wimsatt (1972),Wright (1973),
Cummins (1975), Cohen (1978), Brandon (1981), Millikan (1984), and Neander (1991)
proved seminal in rehabilitating appeals to functionality. For helpful overviews of
how the notion of a function is understood in the philosophy of biology, see Buller
(1999) and Ariew, Cummins, and Perlman (2002).
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• The function of the prototype of the virtue of testimonial justice
is to satisfy a need to correct for prejudice (Fricker).
Each of these claims involves an ascription of functionality: it highlights
an instrumental relation between a prototypical concept or virtue on the
one hand and a need as represented in themodel on the other. This does
notyet in itself carryanyclaims aboutouractual situation,pastorpresent.
But the point of working with such a model is to render visible similar
instrumental need-concept or need-virtue relations in the actual history
of our conceptual practices or within our current conceptual practices.
The dynamic model that is the pragmatic genealogy constitutes a
useful guide to the discernment of such functional patterns because it
represents them in their clearest, most generic form, free of the clutter
andcomplexities of reality, thus sharpeningoureye forsimilar functional
patterns in reality – much as a priming look at a prototypical morel will
assist the morel seeker in spotting morels of varying shapes and colors
hidden underneath the tangle of twigs. And to the extent thatwe indeed
find such instrumental relations in the past or the present, we can use
that as a basis for functional explanations or functional assessments:
insofar as the need-concept or need-virtue relation obtained in the past,
this helps explain why we came to have the concept or virtue; insofar as
the need-concept or need-virtue relation obtains now and around here,
this gives us reasons for or against continuing to cultivate the concept
or virtue.
Moreover, the dynamic models provide prima facie evidence for
these functionality ascriptions in much the same way that design analy-
ses in evolutionary biology do: in both cases, a model is used to show
that a given trait would solve a problem, and this is used as evidence for
thinking that the traits we actually find actually solve similar problems
(see Kincaid (1996, 118–119) for a discussion of design analyses in
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biology). An important difference is that in biology, design analyses
typically turn on optimality arguments – arguments to the effect that a
given trait, such as a certain foraging strategy or a reproductive strategy,
can be mathematically shown to form an optimal solution to a prob-
lem. Pragmatic genealogies, by contrast, turn on what might be called
indispensability arguments. These can be very roughly characterized as
taking the following form:
(P1) Given certain root needsRN, creatures in the state of naturewould
need to solve a certain problem.
(P2) A conceptual practicePwith characteristicsCwould form a salient
solution to that problem.
(P3) There is an undemanding path by which creatures in the state of
nature could come to develop conceptual practice P.
(P4) We share something like the root needs RN, namely RN*, and we
also have something like practice P, namely P*.
(C1) Therefore, P* likely functions to satisfy RN*.
This characterization still begs numerous questions, including notably
questions about howmuch like us these creatures and their environment
are, and what the criteria for similarity between RN and RN* and P
and P* should be – I say more on these questions in Queloz (2018a).
Moreover, it should be noted that (P3) does not figure prominently
in all pragmatic genealogies, although it is an important and much
celebrated feature of Hume’s genealogy that he traces out a path by
which the virtue of justicemight arise withoutmuch foresight or explicit
coordination.7 But the point I want to press here is that this line of
7 For discussions of Hume’s genealogy, see Baier (1988); Blackburn (2008); Cohon
(2008). For discussions of its subsequent importance to game theory, see Binmore
(2005, 4); Charron (1980); Lewis (2002, 4).
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argument does not involve the idea that some behavioral trait can be
mathematically shown to be optimal. The line of argument turns on
the idea that a behavioral trait – more specifically, a concept or virtue
– of some broadly outlined form, characterized only by its ability to
discharge the function at issue, constitutes an indispensable solution to
a problem that any creature with certain needs faces. The argument
does not purport to show that P is optimal; it purports to show that P
is conditionally necessary.
On this account, the core of a pragmatic genealogy is an ascription
of functionality relative to needs. Drawing on a certain understanding
of what human beings need, certain concepts or virtues are presented
as having, among their various actual and potential effects, such effects
as tend either directly or indirectly to meet those needs. As Kincaid
(1990, 1996, 2006, 2007) and others have argued, ascriptions of this sort
are innocuous and capable of surviving scrutiny by those who are
skeptical of functionalism in the social realm, because such ascriptions
of functionality are straightforwardly identifiable with a set of causal
claims: the practice of using or living by a concept or a virtue has certain
effects; these effects contribute to the satisfaction of certain needs; and,
given the transitivity of causation, the practice of using or living by the
concept or virtue therefore helps satisfy these needs.
With any ascription of functionality, there is a question about the
extent to which the functionality in question is observer-relative; to what
extent is this the case for the functionality ascriptions of pragmatic
genealogy? Are they more like Searle’s agentive functionality ascrip-
tions, which are dependent on the purposes agents happen to have?
Or are they more like etiological ascriptions of “proper functions,” in
Millikan’s terminology, which achieve independence from subjective
purposes by basing ascriptions of functionality on objective selection
histories?
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There are reasons to think that pragmatic genealogies are inter-
estingly situated between these two poles. On the one hand, they
involve an observer-relative dimension insofar as they take their basic
normative orientation, which all functional talk requires in one way
or another if it is to allow some sort of discrimination between the
functional and the dysfunctional,8 from needs, and need ascriptions
involve a substantial degree of interpretation: needs are something that
an entity lacks as long as it is described merely in the vocabulary of
physics; it is only once it is described in more normative terms that
needs come into view. At the minimum, these terms must permit a
distinction between survival and death; and more richly normative
terms might allow for further distinctions, first between bare survival
and flourishing, and then between flourishing by, in Williams’s phrase,
“the ethological standard of the bright eye and the gleaming coat”
(2011, 52) and more demanding (but also more socio-historically local)
standards of flourishing, which may include such things as the need for
autonomy or political self-determination. On the other hand, needs are
also more objective than ends and purposes. Unlike ends or purposes,
needs are something one cannot decide to have – they are not subject
to one’s will. Nor are needs subject to the will of the observer, just as
their presence or absence does not depend on the observer’s ends or
purposes. Furthermore, needs are not luminous, which is to say that
one can have them without knowing that one has them. This is also
part of what gives pragmatic genealogies their point, because they can
reveal that we have certain needs which we may not have been aware
we had. Hence, whether or not we have certain needs – such as a need
for the virtues of accuracy and sincerity, or a need for the concept of
8 Functions, as Millikan aptly puts it, are “a measure from which actual facts can
depart” (2005, 83).
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knowledge – is, in all these respects, an objective matter and something
that can come as a discovery.
Functionality ascription, then, is the primary business of pragmatic
genealogy; but once a pragmatic genealogy has suggested and but-
tressed a functionality ascription, this ascription can be used as an
explanatory basis for functional explanations of varying ambitions.
One thing that this explanatory basis might be used for is to explain
the stability or, in Philip Pettit’s (1996, 2000) terminology, the resilience
of the building blocks of our way of life:
Which are the more or less passing ephemera and which the phe-
nomena that are deeply embedded in the society? Which are more
or less incidental or contingent features and which are features apt
to last? There is an interesting research programme suggested by
such questions. It would take any society or culture or institution
and, reviewing the data on various traits displayed by the entity in
question, would seek to separate out the dross from the gold. It would
try to identify and put aside the features that may be expected to come
and go. And it would seek to catalogue the more or less necessary
features that the society or culture or institution displays. It would
give us a usefully predictive stance on the society, providing us with
grounds for thinking that such and such features are likely to stay,
such and such other features likely to disappear. (Pettit 1996, 299–300)
The research programme described here might well be pursued using
pragmatic genealogy as one’s method. Note however that this research
programme need not be backwards-looking at all: claims of resilience
need not involve any factual claims about history being a certain way.
To say that a concept or virtue is resilient because it stands in an
instrumental relation to needs is not necessarily to say that it came
to exist for that reason, or even that this instrumental relation played
any role in its historical development. The conceptual practice could
just have popped into existence, or it might have been instituted by a
mad king on a whim, and yet it might truly be said to be resilient for
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functional reasons, i.e. in ways that could be explained by reference
to the instrumental relations to needs that the conceptual practice,
whatever its genesis, now stands in. Pettit (2000, 48) gives the example
of golf clubs, asking us to imagine that they have come into existence
purely because people enjoy the motions involved in playing golf.
“Consistently with the absence of any such historical selection,” he
notes, “what might well be the case is that golf clubs have certain
effects, certain functional effects, such that were they to come under
any of a variety of pressures, then the fact of having those effects would
ensure that they survived the pressure,” and if so, we can conclude that
“though not the beneficiaries of actual selection, golf clubs do enjoy the
favour of a virtual process of selection” (2000, 48).
Yet to say that the effects of golf clubs would ensure that they
survived any of a variety of pressures is no doubt too strong, since
it would imply that golf clubs are not just resilient, but, as one might
put it, hyper-resilient. The more modest claim advanced by a resilience
explanation should rather be that if, as a community, we were to move
away from golf clubs, this would rob us of some of their functional
effects, and this loss would make itself felt (at least among those for
whom golf clubs are presumed to have functional effects; the fact that
this is likely to be a rather exclusive group, and that the functions in
question are perhaps not functions anyone outside that group would
want to see discharged in the first place, indicate further reasonswhy the
ambitions of resilience explanations are better reined in). The conclusion
we then reach is that there would be some pressure, however limited
in strength and scope, to maintain golf clubs – though whether there
would be enough pressure for them ultimately to survive in the face of
countervailing pressures remains a further question.
A second type of explanation that a functionality ascription might
be used for is the explanation of the actual historical persistence of a
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concept or virtue. This still stops short of claiming that it came into
existence because it serves a need (a claim which would raise questions
about how as yet unrealized effects can bring something to exist). But it
does involve committing oneself to the claim that the fact that the concept
or virtue endured or was retained once it had come into existence had
something to do with its relation to our needs.
In sum, a pragmatic genealogy is in the first instance a narrative
device bywhich to reveal and ground ascriptions of functionality which
can then be used to explain the resilience or even the persistence of
concepts or virtues. We thus get the following schema, with (1) – (3)
together potentially acting as the explanatory basis for an explanation
either of the form of (4) or of the form of (5):
Functionality Ascription (Explanatory Basis):
(1) The practice of living by concept/virtue A causes (sometimes via
inferential consequences) the consequence B.
(2) B helps satisfy need C.
(3) The practice of living by A helps satisfy C.
Functional Explanation:
(4) A is resilient because it helps satisfy C.
(5) A persists because it helps satisfy C.
The key idea that this schema is meant to bring out is that pragmatic
genealogy minimally and primarily serves to substantiate (1) – (3), and
it can, though it need not, also serve to substantiate (4) or (5), be it with
regard to our present situation, with regard to some historical situation,
or both. Two aspects of the schema bear further clarification, however.
First, it is true that on a possible reading of (5), (5) claims no more
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than (4): in Kincaid’s (2007, 223) rendering, for example, one way for
something to persist because it has certain consequences is for it to
be resilient now, whatever its history, in virtue of the fact that there
would be pressures to keep it if we moved away from it. By contrast, I
distinguish (4) and (5) precisely to register the fact that we do undertake
commitments about the history of the concept or virtue as soon as (5)
is read as implying not just counterfactual claims, i.e. claims to the effect
that certain forces would be actualized if a conceptual practice were to
diverge from a certain functionally specified configuration, but factual
claims to the effect that such forces were actualized and are part and
parcel of the causal-historical story explaining why we now find the
concept or virtue.
Second, the qualification “sometimes via inferential consequences”
in (1) registers the fact that the relevant practical consequences of
living by a concept can be more or less immediate consequences of
particular acts of concept application. Sometimes, the relevant practical
consequence of living by a concept is simply the fact that this renders
the concept-user suitably sensitive to the presence of certain items
in the world; but sometimes, the relevant consequences lie further
downstream, and the path towards themmight lead through inferential
consequences, i.e. through the inferences the concept-user is put in a
position to draw by coming to live by the concept. Michael Dummett
(1973, 454) gives the example of a student learning the concept of
validity, and thus coming to be able to distinguish between valid and
invalid arguments. But what gives the concept of validity its point is not
the capacity to make this distinction in itself, but rather the practical
difference made by the inference one can then draw from an argument’s
being valid, namely that one has reason to accept the conclusion given
that one accepts the premises. Consequently, a student who reliably
applied the concept but never drew this inference – who treated the
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distinction between valid and invalid arguments as being like the
distinction between Petrarchan and Shakespearean sonnets – could
perhaps be said to have acquired the concept of validity, but when used
in this way, the concept would fail to tie in with anyone’s needs.
We can illustrate the schema with Craig’s genealogy. Craig’s dy-
namic model highlights the way in which social and language-using
creatures would be driven to develop something like our concept of
knowledge by two sets of practical pressures: the first set of practical
pressures grows out of the fact that each individual needs information
about his or her immediate environment, and is to that extent in the
position of the inquirer: someone who wants to find out whether p. But
for social and language-using beings like us, there are strong incentives
to rely not just on one’s own senses in acquiring information, but to tap
into others’ stores of information. This means that there are pressures
on each inquirer to become able to identify what, given the particular
needs and capacities of that inquirer, are good informants as to whether
p. This the inquirer becomes able to do by developing the concept of
what Kusch (2009, 65) aptly calls proto-knowledge – a concept that serves
to flag good informants.
Proto-knowledge is still markedly different from our concept of knowl-
edge, however, in that it remains strongly indexed to the situation of
the individual concept-user. It tracks whomever is a good informant for
me, given my needs and capacities, here and now. But if we factor in the
second set of practical pressures, we come to see why we in fact operate
the concept of knowledge rather than the concept of proto-knowledge.
This second set of practical pressures arises from the fact that inquirers
have a strong interest in recommending informants to each other; and the
more they do – the more they socially cooperate not just in exchanging
information, but in exchanging information about who is a good source
of information on a given question – the more they have reason to
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operate a concept that it less subjectivized than proto-knowledge. It is
this second set of pressures which leads to the concept of someone
who is a good informant whether p for anyone, whatever their needs
and capacities, anywhere and at any time: someone, in other words,
who knows whether p. The concept of knowledge we end up with in
Craig’s model is thus revealed to perform a social function that is central
to a kind of epistemic division of labor, namely the social practice of
information pooling.
Plugging Craig’s genealogy of the concept of knowledge into the
schema then yields the following:
Functionality Ascription (Explanatory Basis):
(1) The practice of living by the concept of knowledge causes the
flagging of good informants.
(2) The flagging of good informants helps satisfy the need to pool
information.
(3) The practice of living by the concept of knowledge helps satisfy
the need to pool information.
Functional Explanation:
(4) Were the practice of living by the concept of knowledge to come
under pressure, there would be some pressure to drive it back
into use because it helps satisfy the need to pool information.
(5) The fact that the practice of living by the concept of knowledge
helped satisfy the need to pool information in the past caused the
concept to be retained.
To which of these claims does Craig’s genealogy commit him? As he
himself points out, this depends on the purposeswhich the genealogical
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story is taken to serve. “The depth of factual obligation incurred by
a state-of-nature theory depends on its aims,” he writes; it “will be
greatest when its intentions are explanatory, to account for the existence
of the target phenomenon” (Craig 2007, 193). This underscores the
importantmethodological point that pragmatic genealogies in themselves
– i.e. the bare genealogical narratives considered in isolation from the
context and spirit in which they are advanced – do not yet determine
how much is being claimed and what evidence they are beholden to.
These parameters only receive determinate values once the pragmatic
genealogy is put to use in a particular context with a view to performing
a particular task, and these will be different values in different contexts.
In Craig’s own case, the aim is in the first instance to cure us of
the temptation to define our present concept of knowledge in terms of
necessary and sufficient conditions by getting us to look at the concept
from a pragmatic point of view. Once we let our understanding of the
concept grow genealogically out of our understanding of the needs of
inquirers, we will understandwhywe should not expect the application
conditions of the concept of knowledge to be necessary conditions at
all, but rather to reflect the typical conditions under which the concept
has a point for inquirers given their needs. As we saw, this need in
principle amount to no more than to offering a model of a need-concept
relation as a heuristic device by which to reveal whether such relations
also obtain in past or present societies. But Craig aims to do more than
that. In his later reflections on Knowledge and the State of Nature, he
emphasizes that he “was trying to explain how certain real results have
arisen, and only real pressures can produce real results” (Craig 2007,
190, emphasis mine). In accordance with this aim, he notes:
I do and must suppose that there were societies whose members,
collectively and individually, had the needs I ascribe to them andwere
able, whether as the outcome of some conscious process or of other
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equally real tendencies, to find their way to the solution I describe. . . .
My line was, and had to be, that the needs were real and the persons
concerned would have come, in one way or another, to satisfy them.
. . . I had to maintain that the circumstances that favour the formation
of the concept of knowledge still exist, or did until very recently, since
otherwise I would have had no convincing answer to the obvious
question why it should have remained in use . . . (Craig 2007, 191)
On this Craigean reading of Craig, the pragmatic genealogy does not
just serve as a device by which to sharpen our eye for (1) – (3); nor does
it rest content to claim that (1) – (3) are now, for whatever reason, the
case, and that therefore the concept of knowledge is now resilient in
the sense of (4); rather, the genealogy is used to claim (5): to explain
why the concept of knowledge persists.
Of course one might invoke the Death-of-the-Author principle and
insist that authorial intentions are not always the most reliable guide
to a book; but if the account of pragmatic genealogy offered here
is along the right lines, we might accept Craig’s self-interpretation,
find it insufficiently corroborated by evidence and short on detail and
mechanisms, andyet thinknoworse of his pragmatic genealogy,because
the merits of Craig’s genealogy are distinct and separable from the use
he made or took himself to make of it. We must distinguish the method
– offering a dynamic model of the functional relations between needs
and conceptual practices – from the use to which it is put. If, like the
Craig of 2007, we harbor the ambition to use the genealogy outlined
in Knowledge and the State of Nature to explain why the concept of
knowledge persists, we will have incurred a different type of functional
commitment – namely an etiological one – and correspondingly deeper
factual obligations than if we used it simply to reveal the relation of the
concept we now have to some of our present needs. Using the genealogy
effectively to explain the persistence of the concept of knowledge might
well require rather more supporting material than Craig had room for
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in his dense and admirably concise book. But the important point is that
this does not invalidate the genealogy. The genealogy itself is merely a
multipurpose model, a tool that earns its keep in many trades.
Our conclusion, then, is that both the type of functional commitment
and the depth of factual obligation incurred by a pragmatic genealogy
depend on what we use it for. We can use the dynamic models of
pragmatic genealogy merely as heuristic devices by which to sharpen
our understanding of how certain needs bring certain problems and
call for certain solutions while retaining an open mind as to whether a
given society exhibits either those needs or anything like the modelled
answer to them; the model would then serve to sharpen our eye for
the needs and the functional patterns they tend to engender. But we
can also use pragmatic genealogy to reveal (and to bolster our case for)
factual claims about the present or the past. On this basis, we might
make backward-looking use of pragmatic genealogy, deploying it to
account for the persistence and ubiquity of certain arrangements on
the basis of what the genealogy reveals to be their social function. But
we might equally make forward-looking use of pragmatic genealogy,
either confidently to predict that certain arrangements are not going to
go away, because the genealogy reveals them to be resilient; or, on the
contrary, to highlight the reasons we have to cherish and defend these
arrangements against countervailing pressures, because the genealogy
reveals unsuspected ways in which the satisfaction of certain needs
depends on them. Pragmatic genealogy can thus not only be used to
show what something would do for us if we were in a fictional state of
nature; but also what it has done, what it now does, and what it can
continue to do.
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